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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are seventy years old. Your hair is grey, your glasses 
are thick, and you have some trouble hearing when people speak to you. 
You need help standing up and going to the bathroom, you stumble 
because your vision has deteriorated, and you can’t remember if you took 
all of your medications this morning. Now imagine having to live this out 
in prison. You do not have the comfort of someone who can help you to 
the bathroom. You are afraid to bump into other prisoners for fear of 
altercation and you have become an easy target for the younger inmates. 
You are afraid every day and require medical attention that you just do not 
get. Your brain does not work like it used to. Sometimes you wander into 
areas you should not be in, and you get in trouble with the guards–finding 
yourself in even worse conditions, in solitary confinement. 
Prisons are not meant to be nice or comfortable, but they are meant 
to have appropriate accommodations for prisoners who need certain 
arrangements or attention in order to function and live their everyday lives. 
There are avenues where prisoners can redress their grievances for some 
of the inequities they face in prisons and there are alternatives to long, 
painful sentences. However, it is rare to be granted relief from the 
hardships of prison and there is very little compassion for those older 
prisoners who are suffering because they cannot be accommodated. 
Elderly prisoners present unique circumstances that set them apart from 
other prisoners. Their needs are specific and encapsulate the realms of 
mental and physical disabilities. 
Elderly prisoners present the issue of dealing with later-in-life 
diseases such as dementia, deteriorating mental faculties, loss of vision 
and hearing, loss of mobility, the increased need for medications and 
doctor visits, diminished motor skills, incontinence, chronic illnesses, 
terminal illnesses, and an increased susceptibility to other health issues 
such as pneumonia and the flu.1 These prisoners did not necessarily come 
in with these disabilities; they developed them over the course of their 
sentence. It is easy to sentence someone to life in prison and send them 
away to spend their lives in a jail cell, but these people don’t just go away. 
They may be forgotten by the judicial system because their cases are over, 
but they still have constitutional rights that need to be protected. The main 
constitutional issue presented here is one concerning the Eighth 
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment.2 
Vernon Madison, an inmate in Alabama who was sentenced to 
death after being convicted of murdering a police officer in 1985, is 
 
1 Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Saftey Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release For 
Elderly Inmates, 43 Stetson L. Rev. 197 at 204-05 (2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII 
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currently facing being impacted by this exact constitutional issue.3 Since 
being convicted, Madison has suffered two strokes and has developed 
dementia, along with other health issues4 Madison no longer remembers 
his crime or why he is in prison.5 The issue of whether it is constitutional 
to execute Mr. Madison – someone who does not remember his crime – or 
if it is considered cruel and unusual punishment, has reached the Supreme 
Court.6 In this case, the Court held that in order to satisfy the standard of 
mental incapacity sufficient to stay an execution, the individual must be 
unable to rationally understand why the state wants to execute him.7 The 
Court ultimately felt that while memory loss or mental incapacity in itself 
may not always be enough to stay an execution, Madison’s specific case 
deserved a second look due to his inability to understand his punishment 
– as such, the case was vacated and remanded.8 Additionally, there is the 
underlying issue of whether keeping a prisoner in prison who is feeble and 
infirmed is, itself, cruel and unusual punishment. Perhaps compassionate 
release could ease some of these issues, but this has been widely debated 
and highly controversial in recent years. There are policy issues 
concerning general deterrence of criminals and punishment of the 
individual for their specific crime. While having an individual serve their 
entire sentence benefits society from a penological standpoint, the effect 
on the individual is diminished, or altogether lost, when they have a 
decreased capacity to understand or there is unnecessarily increased 
suffering imposed on older prisoners. 
This note will address the topic of elderly prisoners and how they 
are marginalized in the prison system. Part 1 will discuss the 
aforementioned case of Madison v. Alabama9, including the facts of the 
case, the procedural posture, implications of the ruling and the policy and 
societal issues at stake in the case regarding the punishment of elderly 
prisoners. Part II will discuss incarceration rates of individuals who are 
arrested later in life and “older criminals” who are coming into the prison 
system. Part II will also discuss the prevalence of prisoners who are 
growing old in prison, and how the environment and their needs have 
changed over time. Part III will discuss the judicial response to elderly 
 
3 Deborah Barfield Berry, Bryan Lyman, & Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Hears 






7 Id. at 726. 
8 Id. at 727-28. 
9 See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019). 
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prisoner issues, prior decisions on compassionate release, and how older 
prisoners seeking alternative methods of punishment are handled in the 
judicial system. Part IV will analyze the implications of Madison v. 
Alabama, as well as possible solutions to the issue of elderly prisoners and 
lack of accommodations in general.10 Part V will conclude the note with a 
summary of the issues presented and discuss the constitutional and 
individual rights implicated in the context of the Eighth Amendment and 
in the context of the Madison v. Alabama decision.11 
II. MADISON’S SUPREME COURT PETITION 
The case of Madison v. Alabama involves a man named Vernon 
Madison, who was convicted and sentenced to death for killing a police 
officer in Mobile, Alabama.12 His crime was committed in 1985 and after 
three separate trials and exhausting the appeals process, Madison’s case 
made it to the Supreme Court.13 However, during Madison’s thirty years 
in prison, he suffered two strokes and was known to have suffered from 
mental health issues.14 Due to vascular dementia, he claimed he could no 
longer remember committing his crime, he could not remember the 
victim’s name, or his previous trials.15 The issue in the Supreme Court 
appeal was “whether a ‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental 
illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of the ‘State’s rationale for 
his execution.’”16 
Madison argued that he met the standard set to determine 
incompetency that would render his execution unlawful, which is 
“whether a ‘prisoner’s concept of reality’ is ‘so impair[ed]’ that he cannot 
grasp the ‘execution’s meaning and purpose’ or the ‘link between [his] 
crime and its punishment.’”17 He asserted that his multiple strokes and 
vascular dementia interfered with his ability to understand and 
comprehend his execution.18 Additionally, Madison argued there should 
be wider protection and an expanded legal standard under the Eighth 
Amendment to broaden the scope of mental disorders allowed for 
 
10 Id. 
11 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
12 Lauren Davendorf & Luis L. Lozada, Madison v. State of Alabama, LEGAL INFO. INST. 




16 Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2019). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 722. 
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incompetence.19 The Eighth Amendment guards against cruel and unusual 
punishment, and Madison argued that executing him with his diminished 
capacity to understand his surroundings and circumstances would violate 
his constitutional rights and infringe on his Eighth Amendment 
protections.20 
The state of Alabama, on the other hand, argued that the defendant 
should be executed if he can “rationally understand his punishment and if 
this understanding mirrors the general communities’ understanding of 
these concepts.”21 The State contended that since he renounces his 
punishment, he must have an understanding of how crime and punishment 
fit together.22 The State also had concerns about the implications of 
expanding the incompetency standards.23 There is a fear that expanding 
the standard to be more inclusive of mental disorders would incentivize 
prisoners to claim mental deficiency to reduce or escape their sentence, 
and that this would make it easier for these prisoners to obtain a stay from 
execution or lighter sentences.24 The State cited studies that have shown 
the average age of prisoners on death row has increased and thus the 
likelihood of prisoners claiming incompetency on death row would 
increase with the more lenient standards for determining incompetency.25 
Further, the State contended that Madison’s memory disorder should not 
exempt him from execution under the Eighth Amendment.26 To further 
this argument, the State pointed out that no law has been passed by any 
state to prohibit execution of a defendant suffering from memory loss or 
who does not remember their crime.27 It is important to note that the 
American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological 
Association have recommended that no defendant with a severe mental 
disorder be executed; however, the state argued that this has not 
traditionally been followed in the judicial system.28 The ultimate argument 
by the State is that this execution of a man who has vascular dementia and 
has suffered multiple strokes would not violate standards of decency set 
forth by the Eighth Amendment.29 
The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) 
supported the State’s case, advocating to continue the trend of stricter 
 
19 Id. at 723-25; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
20 Davendorf, supra note 12, U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 








29 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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penalties for crimes against police officers.30 Recently, the Protect and 
Serve Act was passed to make criminal sanctions for crimes against police 
more severe and to give police the same protections as those who are 
victims of hate crimes.31 NAPO has previously stated that dementia or 
memory loss does not make a defendant less responsible for the murder he 
committed and that the memory loss does not matter and, in effect, should 
not even be taken into consideration.32 
These two opposing arguments are only one facet of the issues 
elderly prisoners face, especially those facing life sentences or the death 
penalty. For example, another issue which often comes up in this context 
is the importance of general deterrence versus that of punishing the 
individual and bringing justice for a particular victim and their family. 
Executing a person with severe mental deterioration would not serve to 
further general deterrence–the punishment is too harsh for society to 
condone, even though it would deter criminals from committing heinous 
crimes in fear of a similar fate as Madison. Individual (specific) deterrence 
is not served either. In Madison’s case, he has served 30 years in prison, 
spending a majority of his time in solitary confinement; he had suffered 
two strokes, has severe memory loss, and continues to serve his sentence 
for a crime he does not remember.33 Executing Madison would not serve 
to deter him from future crime, since he does not know why he is being 
executed nor the crime that got him in jail in the first place.34 It may, of 
course, provide closure or a sense that justice has been served to the family 
of Madison’s particular victim – as such, depending on which of these 
purported purposes of criminal law and punishment one finds to be more 
persuasive, one may or may not find Madison’s execution to serve a 
justifiable purpose at all. 
The implications of the Madison decision will have a lasting 
impact on the criminal justice system. This opinion will echo throughout 
prisons all over the country. In Ford v. Wainwright,35 the court held that 
executing the incompetent is unconstitutional because the retributive and 
deterrent goals of the death penalty are not served by punishing someone 
who does not understand, or who is not aware, of his punishment nor the 
 
30 Lauren Devendorf, Luís L. Losada, Madison v. State of Alabama, Cornell Law School 
Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-7505. 
31 Emanuella Grinberg, New Bill Offers Police Officers Protections Similar to Those For 
Hate Crime Victims, CNN (May 8, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics 
/protect-and-serve-act/index.html. 
32 Devendorf, supra note 30. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986). 
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reason for his punishment. Furthering this holding is Atkins v. Virginia,36 
which ruled the execution of the “mentally retarded” is unconstitutional 
due to the lack of culpability in relation to the severity of the punishment. 
However, Allen v. Ornoski37 holds that limits on the death penalty set by 
the Supreme Court are grounded in the fact that some people, such as 
minors, are less culpable than others, but old age and infirmity do not 
render an individual less culpable at the time of the offense. These cases 
exemplify the split between the courts when deciding this issue and set a 
powerful foundation for the forthcoming decision. 
III. GROWING OLD IN PRISON AND OTHER OPTIONS 
In general, when society thinks of criminals and prisoners, young 
people come to mind.38 However, the reality is that prisons are populated 
by a mix of old and young prisoners.39 Elderly prisoners make up eight 
percent of the national state prison population.40 This means that 8,354 
prisoners in state prisons are over the age of fifty.41 It is predicted that by 
the year 2030, one-third of the prison population will be over the age of 
fifty.42 Over the last two decades, the older inmate population has 
increased by 750% nationwide.43 This will continue to increase the costs 
to incarcerate these individuals, as the average elderly prisoner is affected 
by around three chronic illnesses requiring medical attention and those not 
affected by illness still need help navigating their daily lives in prison.44 
Young men and women who enter the prison system age as their sentences 
pass, and these young offenders are now older men and women who are 
adjusting to a different type of life in prison. 
It is not only young offenders who enter the prison system, 
however.45 Older individuals do commit crimes and enter the prison 
system already as members of the senior population.46 Since these 
offenders are older, they are more likely to get lengthier sentences, thus 
 
36 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
37 Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006). 





42 See Casey N. Ferri, Comment, A Stuck Safety Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate 
Release For Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197 (2014). 
43 See William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the 
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 855 (2009). 
44 Ferri, supra note 42. 
45 Id. at 200. 
46 Id. 
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creating a greater likelihood they will age through the system.47 It has been 
shown that the amount of elderly criminals is increasing.48 Crime is not 
limited to those who are young, and society often forgets or neglects to 
think about these older offenders.49 Older offenders experience unique 
issues in prison and in the judicial system, which can include adjusting to 
prison, being more vulnerable to victimization (by both other prisoners 
and prison staff, including guards) once imprisoned, learning to live in the 
limited physical space prisons provide, having limited access to programs, 
and dealing with the diversity of ages in the prison populations.50 Most 
prison programs were designed for young offenders and do not take into 
account the elderly.51 
With a 0.01% release rate, many of these elderly prisoners are left 
to serve their entire sentences without any sort of compassionate release 
or special accommodations for special needs that may arise.52 There has 
been much conversation on the topic of compassionate release, with an 
underwhelming amount of action taken on the subject.53 Compassionate 
release is defined as when the court chooses to terminate or reduce a 
prisoner’s sentence when that prisoner meets a set of stringent criteria set 
forth in a federal statute.54 While this may sound beneficial, particularly to 
elderly prisoners,  compassionate release programs “ . . . simply do[] not 
reach enough inmates to make a tangible difference.”55 In 1984, Congress 
passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which called for the adoption 
of a sentencing commission who would create mandatory sentencing 
guidelines for federal judges.56 In this act, there are safety-valve provisions 
aimed at avoiding injustice.57 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c) allows for modification 
of sentences under certain conditions.58 This provides that one way of 
modifying a sentence would be to show a finding of “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons to warrant a reduction, or the defendant is at least 
seventy years of age, has served at least thirty years in prison and the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons determines the individual is not a danger 
to society or to anyone’s safety.59 
 
47 Id. at 201. 
48 Gennaro, supra note 38. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 19 




56 Berry, supra note 43. 
57 Id. at 859. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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Only recently did the United States Sentencing Commission 
modify their guidelines to explain what “extraordinary and compelling” 
means.60 This new commentary provided that extraordinary and 
compelling can “include terminal illness, debilitating physical illness that 
prevents self-care, and death or incapacitation of the only family member 
able to care for a child.”61 This list is not exhaustive and the Commission 
had provided that other extraordinary and compelling circumstances may 
warrant compassionate release.62 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Report on the SRA explains the purpose behind the safety-valve provision 
as such: 
“The Committee believes that there may be unusual cases 
in which an eventual reduction in the length of a term of 
imprisonment is justified by changed circumstances. 
These would include cases of severe illness, cases in 
which other extraordinary and compelling circumstances 
justify a reduction of an unusually long sentence, and 
some cases in which the sentencing guidelines for the 
offense of which the defend [ant] was convicted have 
been later amended to provide a shorter term of 
imprisonment.”63 
Conversely, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has said that any 
extraordinary and compelling events giving rise to compassionate release 
need to have been reasonably unforeseen at the time of the sentencing.64 
The interpretation of this provision has usually meant that the inmate is 
terminally ill or near death.65 However, it is hard to figure out what would 
be foreseeable and what would not, which is why the Director of the BOP 
has scarcely used his discretion to file motions for release.66 
The meaning and application of “extraordinary and compelling” 
within the compassionate release context is at the heart of the Madison v. 
Alabama case.67 Madison argues it is extraordinary and compelling to 
release a man in his situation –a man far removed from his former self.68 
It is absurd, Madison argues, to punish the man that he is today, when he 
cannot even recall the man who he once was, who committed this crime. 
 
60 Id. at 858. 
61 Id. at 853. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 860. 
64 Id. at 862. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 863. 
67 Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019). 
68 Devendorf, supra note 30. 
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The State argues that he has not been punished enough, and that the family 
of the deceased police officer deserves for Madison’s sentence to be fully 
executed – in every sense of the word – in order to bring about justice.69 
So how does one reconcile what morally would be “extraordinary and 
compelling,” but statutorily may miss the mark? 
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Jurisdictions and courts have widely varied in their rulings on 
reducing sentences, especially when it comes to capital punishment. With 
a controversial topic such as this one, it is no surprise that the courts have 
been split on how to handle this issue, which makes the ultimate decision 
of Madison v. Alabama by the Supreme Court that much more impactful. 
The Madison decision will have a lasting impact on prisoner rights, elderly 
prisoner accommodations and programs, and will shape the future of 
compassionate release. The Eighth Amendment is implicated in the 
question of whether it is cruel and unusual to keep older prisoners 
incarcerated through their older age, and if prisoners set to be executed 
should be executed even withstanding any ailments, infirmities or 
disabilities they have obtained over their years in prison. 
To start, the Eighth Amendment protects against, among other 
things, cruel and unusual punishment.70 “The Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment . . .  limits the power of 
the legislative body to establish penalties for crimes, restricts the courts 
when sentencing convicted defendants, and protects prisoners from excess 
of prison authorities in the Executive Branch.”71 Rhodes v. Robinson 
defines the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting the “wanton and 
unnecessary infliction of pain upon persons in custody.”72 “The test of 
cruel and unusual punishment considers whether the infliction grossly 
exceeds the legitimate need for force and violates the standards of 
contemporary society.”73 To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, conduct 
must be more egregious than that sufficient to establish a common law 
tort.74 The Eighth Amendment specifically provides that there should not 





71 Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
72 Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766 at 771 (3rd Cir., Dec. 28, 1979). 
73 Id. 
74 Mussomelli, 722 F.2d at 1132. 
75 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
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The Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia ruled that capital 
punishment for the crime of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.76 Because the punishment must generally 
fit the crime committed, courts have ruled that capital punishment is most 
acceptable in situations of murder because the offender deliberately took 
another’s life.77 However, courts have ruled that capital punishment for 
the crime of murder can still be considered unconstitutional in certain 
cases.78 
For example, in Ford v. Wainwright, the Court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to execute someone who is incompetent, the rationale for 
this being that the deterrent affect is not served by executing someone who 
does not understand the crime, their punishment, or their trial.79 This Court 
noted that an evidentiary hearing to determine the mental capacity of the 
individual is required and the proper procedural safeguards, such as having 
an attorney and a fair trial, were necessary.80 Additionally, in Atkins v. 
Virginia, the Court held that it is unconstitutional to execute a “mentally 
retarded” individual.81 The Court noted that while their mental capacity 
does not exempt them from criminal sanctions, it is unconstitutional to 
execute them due to a lesser degree of understanding and awareness.82 
Following this, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court ruled that when imposing the 
death penalty, the jury should be allowed to consider mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, including the individual’s character.83 The 
Court held that once a prisoner is sentenced to the death penalty, the 
sentence must be imposed unless: 
When considering the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history, character, and condition of the 
offender, the sentencing judge determines that at least one 
of the following mitigating circumstances is established 
by the preponderance of the evidence. . . that the offense 
was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or 
mental deficiency.84 
This holds that a person’s mental condition at the time of the 
offense affects their ability to be sentenced to death, and when read in the 
 
76 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
77 Id. at 203. 
78 Id. at 174. 
79 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
80 Id. at 410. 
81 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
82 Id. at 318. 
83 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978). 
84 Id. at 593-94. 
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context of other death penalty cases, this provides that a person’s lack of 
mental capacity can render them unable to be executed, period, as doing 
so would violate the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and 
unusual punishment.85 Regardless of whether the person is incapacitated 
at the time of the crime, the time of the trial, or at the time of their 
execution, the precedent holds that capital punishment of someone who 
has lessened mental faculties is cruel and unusual and cannot be done 
without offending the constitution.86 
However, there are issues with the cases cited above where great 
ambiguity lies. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court never provided a viable 
guideline on how to determine if a person claiming mental incapacity falls 
within the protection of the Eighth Amendment.87 In Hall v. Florida, the 
Court held that a man whose IQ was seventy-one, rather than seventy or 
below, which Florida proscribed was the cutoff for intellectual disability, 
was allowed to present evidence of his intellectual disability before being 
sentenced to death.88 The Court noted that an objective standard, such as 
an IQ test, for determining intellectual disability was not enough to ensure 
a fair process; however, subjective components make the process complex 
as well.89 This is to say there is no one-size-fits-all category of mental 
illness or developmental delay that renders someone exempt from 
execution. 
Conversely, courts have ruled that old age and infirmity do not 
render the individual less culpable at the time of the offense.90 In Allen v. 
Ornoski, a prisoner, who was blind, old, and infirmed, had been on death 
row for murder for twenty-three years.91 The court held that his physical 
infirmity had nothing to do with his mental state at the time of the crime 
nor did it affect his ability to understand why he was being executed.92 The 
Court found that the execution of the elderly and the infirm generally had 
no legal support and could not be sustained in this case.93 The prosecution 
in these cases often argues that the retributive and penological purposes 
served by the death penalty are still served and there is a strong deterrent 
effect on those who are thinking of committing similar crimes, as long as 
the individual who is being executed understands the nature of why they 
 
85 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
86 536 U.S. at 304. 
87 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 718 (2014); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
88 Hall, 572 U.S. at 724. 
89 Id. at 724. 
90 Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir., 2006). 
91 Id. at 949. 
92 Id. at 952. 
93 Id. at 954. 
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are being executed.94 Courts have also ruled that spending a significant 
amount of time on death row in harsh conditions does not render someone 
unable to be executed.95 
This brings up the issue of treatment of older prisoners in the 
prison system and the lack of options for those suffering in prison. As 
Ornoski prescribes, elderly prisoners can be executed as long as their 
mental state is not affected and they understand why they are being 
executed.96 However, the rationale in Ornoski and other death penalty 
jurisprudence does not consider what, if any, avenues of relief are 
available for elderly prisoners who are not on death row, necessarily. 
Courts have also ruled on the imposition of alternative punishments, such 
as compassionate release and other means of alleviating the unusual and 
cruel conditions elderly prisoners face that are not on death row. As stated 
above, the standard for extraordinary and compelling are circumstances 
not foreseen at the time of sentencing, and can include terminal illness, 
debilitating physical illness that prevents self-care, and death or 
incapacitation of the only family member able to care for a child, but this 
list is not exhaustive.97 Additionally, compassionate release can only be 
granted upon a motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.98 
The case of United States v. Dimasi held that the reduction of an 
inmate’s sentence from eight to five years was warranted even though 
there was no terminal illness, because the defendant met the criteria to be 
considered an elderly prisoner with “extraordinary and compelling” 
circumstances due to a high level of care and services that he required that 
could not be afforded to him in prison.99 However, in the case United 
States v. Dresbach, a man with a terminal illness, whose wife and child 
also suffered from health issues, was denied compassionate release 
because the Director of the Bureau of Prisons had exercised its discretion 
in reviewing the case and had given a reasonable basis for the denial of the 
inmate’s request.100 The Court acknowledged that while there are medical 
 
94 Id. at 953; Garrett Epps, The Machinery of Death is Back on the Docket, (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/tinkering-with-the-machinery-of-
death/570421/ (describing the State of Alabama’s focus on the retributive effect of capital 
punishment and their goal to maintain Madison’s sentence as long as he knows why he is 
being punished). 
95 See generally Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
96 See Ornoski, 435 F.3d at 951-52. 
97 Berry, supra note 43, at 863; see also Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Saftey Valve: The 
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and non-medical reasons for compassionate release, the BOP had properly 
used its discretion in denying the request.101 Additionally, courts have held 
that even terminal illness does not warrant compassionate release, arguing 
that the Eighth Amendment does not require release of a terminally ill 
individual.102 The juxtaposition of these two cases shows that 
compassionate release is an inadequate remedy to the unique issues faced 
by elderly prisoners, in large part because of the vast discretion that the 
BOP – and, in turn, courts – have in granting or denying it. Indeed, as long 
as the BOP has followed their procedure and the sentence does not offend 
the Eighth Amendment’s protection of cruel and unusual punishment, a 
denial of compassionate release will be upheld by courts.103 
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The finality of the death penalty is not the problem in Madison v. 
Alabama, nor is it an issue of the punishment fitting the crime. The 
problem is whether it is constitutionally acceptable to execute a man who 
has suffered severe health issues, who no longer remembers his crime and 
who is, for all intents and purposes, no longer the same person who 
committed the crime.104 Madison has suffered multiple strokes, is legally 
blind, and can no longer recite the alphabet or rephrase a sentence.105 He 
also requires assistance walking and using the restroom.106 Taking these 
things into account, it is difficult to argue that it is constitutional to utilize 
such harsh and irreversible punishments as the death penalty as a viable 
method of fulfilling the goals of criminal law and punishment. If these 
individuals cannot or should not be executed, that of course begs the 
question of what should be done with them – that question can be simply 
answered in one of two ways: to keep Madison (and others like him) in 
prison, or to set him free via compassionate release. 
As stated above, the concept of compassionate release is hard to 
obtain and there are little other alternatives for elderly prisoners in similar 
cases where the punishment may be on the brink of being cruel and 
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unusual.107 One possible solution would be to reform and completely redo 
the compassionate release standards and guidelines. This would make 
compassionate release a more accessible tool for prisoners who fit the 
criteria, rather than making the process so cumbersome with little result or 
progress for the inmate. There are stories where inmates have not been 
released in time to see their loved ones pass, even though they were set to 
be released in a few months.108 It seems that executing a man with no 
memory of his crime in a dire health condition would implicate a similar 
sort of compelling circumstance. Madison was set to be executed on 
January 25, 2018; however, this did not happen.109  Upon review, Madison 
was ruled incompetent to be executed, but in the same month was cleared 
and his execution was reinstated.110 Madison’s counsel placed emphasis 
on the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment, relying on the decision of Ford v. Wainwright stating that it 
is cruel and unusual punishment to execute a man with severe cognitive 
dysfunction with memory loss and a lack of understanding as to the 
conditions of his execution.111 This seems to be another example where an 
inmate is not able to present evidence of their incapacity, or where it is 
merely ignored.112 
Hearings such as this one are incredibly hard to navigate. An 
overhaul of the concept of compassionate release would make the process 
Madison is going through more streamlined and accessible by providing 
clear guidelines to assess the individual circumstances of each case. With 
more clarity, comes more availability and uniformity across the judicial 
system. The Commission has tried to define the “extraordinary and 
compelling” standards that warrant a motion for release, but the 
application has been messy and inconsistent.113 
The State argued that to expand the standard for mental illness in 
this way leaves the door open to abuse of the system.114 The State urged 
that following the Ford ruling would incentivize defendants to claim 
mental illness as a scapegoat to avoid execution.115 The State argued that 
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Madison is fit to be executed because he understands the correlation 
between crime and punishment and knows he is being punished for 
committing a crime.116 Additionally, the State argues that since he insists 
his punishment is unfair, he is fit to understand what is happening and why 
it is happening.117 The State contends that Madison is suffering from a 
memory disorder and this does not fall under the category of mental 
illness, which would allow him to escape his sentence using a one-size-
fits-all approach. 118 However, the State’s one-size-fits-all approach is not 
the answer. 
As Madison contended, there are a variety of mental illnesses, 
some we know more about and some we know less about.119 This does not 
change the fact that it is inhumane to execute someone who is experiencing 
mental illness. The Hall v. Florida decision strikes an important chord by 
stating that while the Ford decision may be extreme and all encompassing, 
it is important to review each case at a microscopic and individual level 
before signing off that someone is or is not fit for execution.120 Taking this 
concept a step further, another solution could be to impose mandatory 
mental competency hearings upon receipt of petitions for compassionate 
release, especially in capital cases.121 This would be a thorough way for 
the courts to look at each case and each individual to decide the appropriate 
course of action to level the playing field for everyone involved.122 
Arbitrary decisions based on a piece of paper do not seem to be furthering 
justice here. However, this proposal is not perfect as it would likely lead 
to an influx in petitions from inmates wanting to be examined, thus 
flooding the already crowded courtrooms. 
Another possible solution would be to take a totality of the 
circumstances approach, rather than just looking at the individual and their 
current mental deficiencies. This approach would include looking at the 
crime and everything that happened afterward, including the prisoner’s life 
inside the prison system and health conditions. Madison has a host of 
issues, not limited to his memory loss. He has suffered severe health issues 
and has served the majority of his time in solitary confinement, which has 






120 See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 724 (2014). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Lauren Davendorf, Luís L. Lozada, Madison v. State of Alabama, https://www. 
law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-7505 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); see also Kristin Weir, 
Alone, in ‘the hole’, 43 Monitor on Psychol. 54 (2012). 
2019] EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING 57 
 
should look at the whole picture, rather than focusing on trying to fit the 
individual into a box that they feel encompasses their version of mental 
health or mental incapacity. 
It is important to keep in mind that just as much as the punishment 
must fit the crime, the punishment should also fit the person. It is important 
to make sure that the identity of the offender and the identity of the inmate 
up for execution are the same. Madison is no longer the same man who 
committed his heinous crime. Throughout the years, at the consequence of 
medical and psychological issues, he has transformed into someone far 
removed from the offender he came into prison as. There are situations 
with older prisoners who are not on death row where keeping the inmate 
incarcerated no longer fits the crime. People are able to be reformed, and 
incarceration may no longer serve a purpose, other than keeping someone 
locked up for the sake of locking them up. This is true when the individual 
is suffering through prison life and could be let out to a medical facility or 
a more accessible place for them to be. 
There are viable options for older prisoners who no longer belong 
in harsh prison environments. Besides parole and probation, taking 
prisoners who belong in a medical facility and transferring them to an 
alternate permanent residency is another solution.124 It offends the Eighth 
Amendment to keep older people in prison where they lack basic care and 
accommodations. Creating a medical facility to keep all of the resources 
needed to care for these individuals would lower costs to the state, while 
making it easy to accommodate older prisoners without actually releasing 
them.125 This would provide the ability for more targeted services, more 
specialized attention, and would eliminate the need for transfer from 
location to location.126 Additionally, these older prisoners would be in a 
safer place, away from younger men who serve as a threat to them.127 
However, opening the door to releasing older prisoners does bring 
about some issues. The courts are often hesitant to grant certain releases 
of inmates due to the fear of opening the floodgates. The criteria for being 
“old and infirmed” is so broad and can encompass so many different 
conditions that it would be hard for the court to differentiate between who 
should get released and who is merely trying to shorten their sentence by 
claiming they have aged and are uncomfortable in prison, without much 
of a compelling basis for being released. As it is, it is hard to determine 
who is mentally sound enough to be executed and who is not. It is no 
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wonder the court has difficulty granting these releases, with such a strict 
and somewhat vague criteria to guide them. When you think of the 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances test laid out by the 
Sentencing Commission, many people could already claim that they have 
met this standard.128 The courts are navigating how far they want to extend 
this standard and how feasible they wish to make prison release for older 
inmates who may have compelling and justified reasons for being released 
early or who wish to be spared from their sentence of capital 
punishment.129 The public also has an interest in enforcing the punishment 
to produce a retributive and deterrent effect, which may not happen if these 
individuals are released before their sentence is up.130 
There is also the added problem of placing the burden of housing 
and caring for these inmates on those out in society.131 This includes not 
only the physical responsibility of caring and looking after these people, 
but the enormous financial burden that comes with housing, feeding and 
looking after someone.132 Additionally, any facilities the individual would 
need to be placed in, such as medical care or end-of-life care, would need 
to be paid for somehow and this burden would likely fall on the state, 
leaving taxpayers still paying for these inmates long after they have been 
released.133 To release these prisoners, it is not merely about letting them 
out–it is about making sure they are able to sustain themselves once they 
are out and that they continue to stay out of trouble. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Aging prisoners are a large group of people who have been 
overlooked throughout history and are often inadequately taken care of in 
attempts at prison reformation. This group of roughly one third of 
prisoners nation-wide are struggling to find their way in their daily lives, 
in the prison system, and ultimately out of prison.134 Compassionate 
release is a theory that sounds good on paper, but translates rather poorly 
in real life.135 With a lack of programs for the elderly, in prison and to get 
out of prison, this group will continue to be marginalized until real reform 
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happens, with an emphasis being on those over fifty. Compassionate 
release needs a revamped standard of review to make this idea of releasing 
those who no longer need to be in prison or those who have been punished 
enough to fit the crime a reality instead of a distant and unattainable ideal. 
The Supreme Court showed Madison a modicum of compassion 
and ruled that the prisoner must have the ability to understand his 
punishment.136 However, it almost seems as if extraordinary and 
compelling is an impossible standard to meet. Madison is a man, who at 
one point in his life committed a horrible crime.137 However, his identity 
has changed because of various medical conditions and the punishment he 
has endured throughout his thirty-plus years in prison.138 He has remained 
in solitary confinement, despite vision loss, memory loss and multiple 
strokes.139 The Supreme Court found the compassionate thing to do was 
to release this man, who is no longer mentally the man who committed the 
crime, from the burden of his execution. The emphasis in the prison system 
should be on punishing the individual, and when the individual is “no 
longer there,” then the punishment should be reviewed and potentially 
revised. 
To kill a man, who does not remember his crime, his trial, the 
victim, and maybe even himself, is a merciless killing. It is not to be said 
that Madison did not deserve punishment for his crime. A life is a life, and 
Madison’s life is not the same after his experience in the prison system. 
He wears his punishment of solitary confinement and poor health every 
day in prison. His punishment has not been lost on him, even if he has lost 
who he is and what he did. The Supreme Court’s ruling has answered 
many questions, and the Madison v. Alabama decision will have a lasting 
impact on impaired prisoners on death row, older prisoner’s suffering in 
prisons, and ultimately it will have the most extraordinary and compelling 
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